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ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED DAYS: A HISTORY




In response to the perceived danger of a drastic curtailment in the
availability of health care services in Florida as the result of a mal-
practice insurance crisis, the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of
1975 (the Act)' was enacted. The legislature believed that the rap-
idly increasing cost and decreasing availability of professional lia-
bility insurance for health care providers could result in older phy-
sicians retiring sooner, in younger physicians not coming to
Florida, in substantially higher bills to patients due to increased
costs of insurance premiums, and in increased practice of defensive
medicine.2
The legislative response included procedural and substantive
modifications to the tort system, as well as provisions designed to
insure the continued availability of medical liability coverage and
to increase the discipline of negligent and incompetent physicians.'
* Ladd Professor of Evidence, Florida State University College of Law. B.S. 1962, Iowa
State University; J.D. 1964, University of Iowa. The author wishes to express his apprecia-
tion to Louisa E. Hargrett, Daniel J. Buker and Vicki G. Kaufman for their assistance in the
preparation of this article.
1. Ch. 75-9, § 5, 1975 Fla. Laws 13 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.44, .47 (1979)).
There is now dispute as to whether this medical malpractice insurance crisis ever actually
existed. See Cunningham & Lane, Malpractice-The Illusory Crisis, 54 FLA. BAR J. 114
(1980); The Crisis in Medical Professional Negligence: Fact or Fancy?, Monograph Series,
2 ABA LITIGATION SECTION 1 (1977),
The Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare has conducted a broad study of the medi-
cal malpractice problem. See Medical Malpractice, Report of the Secretary's Commission on
Medical Malpractice, Dept. of H.E.W. (Jan. 16, 1973).
2. See French, Florida Departs from Tradition: The Legislative Response to the Medi-
cal Malpractice Crisis, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 423 (1978); Spence & Stillman, Medical Media-
tion, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1155 (1979).
3. For a discussion of similar legislative actions in other states see Kovnat, Medical Mal-
practice Legislation in New Mexico, 7 N.M. L. REv. 5 (1976-77); Kravat, Medical Malprac-
tice Panels: The Wisconsin Approach, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 55 (1977-78); Ladimer, Maine's
Medical Malpractice Reform Law: Competency; Reports; Arbitration; Screening; Tort
Changes, 661 INs. L.J. 107 (1978); Ripps, The Ohio Medical Malpractice Statute: An Anal-
ysis, 4 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 24 (1977); Siedel, Malpractice Reform in Michigan, 1976 Dgr. C.
L. REV. 235 (1976); Wade, The Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas,
44 INS. COUNSEL J. 650 (1977); Comment, Recent Developments in Medical Malpractice
Law, 1977 Asiz. ST. L.J. 163; Note, The Massachusetts Medical Malpractice Statute: A
Constitutional Perspective, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1289 (1977); Note, The Indiana Medical
Malpractice Act: Legislative Surgery on Patients' Rights, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 303 (1976);
Note, Recent Legislation: The Kansas Approach to Medical Malpractice, 16 WASHBURN
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The most significant provision of the Act was the creation of a
statutory system which required that a malpractice claim be sub-
mitted to a medical liability mediation panel as a condition prece-
dent to filing a civil tort suit." If a defendant did not answer within
twenty days from the date a mediation claim was filed, a claimant
could proceed in court. If an answer was timely filed, the claim was
heard by a mediation panel consisting of a judicial referee, an at-
torney and a licensed physician. The panel's jurisdicition termi-
nated either ten months after the claim was filed or, if prior to the
expiration of the ten-month period, when its written decision was
filed.5 The decision as to whether a defendant was actionably negli-
gent was not binding on the parties but was admissible in the sub-
sequent trial.6 It was felt that mediation panels would encourage
settlement of meritorious claims since a defendant would be hesi-
tant to proceed to a trial in which the panel's finding of actionable
negligence would be introduced against him. On the other hand,
nonmeritorious malpractice suits would be reduced after a finding
by the panel that there was no actionable negligence by any
defendant. 7
The Act, which became effective July 1, 1975, contained a num-
ber of ambiguities which caused many uncertainties for those in-
volved in the mediation procedure. 8 The Supreme Court attempted
to clarify some of these uncertainties when it adopted the Rules of
Medical Mediation Procedure which superseded the procedural
portions of the Act.9
L.J. 395 (1977); Note, Alternatives to the Medical Malpractice Phenomenon: Damage Lim-
itations, Malpractice Review Panels and Countersuits, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1179
(1977).
4. See French, Florida Departs From Tradition: The Legislative Response to the Medi-
cal Malpractice Crisis, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 423 (1978); Thornton, The Value of Medical
Mediation, 53 FLA. BAR J. 592 (1979). See also, 49 FLA. BAR J. 498 (1975) (the issue is
devoted to five articles which discuss some of the problems raised by the Medical Mediation
Panel).
5. See FLA. STAT. § 768.44(1)(c), (2), (4), (7) (1979); Fla. R. Med. P. 20.190, 348 So. 2d
547, 550 (Fla. 1977).
6. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
7. See French, Florida Departs from Tradition: The Legislative Response to the Medi-
cal Malpractice Crisis, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 423 (1978).
8. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(10), .47(3) (1979). For instance, it was unclear whether the Act
was to be strictly construed regarding the three member panel and the jurisdictional time
limits. These and other ambiguities are discussed later in this article.
9. In re The Florida Bar, 348 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1977). The order adopting the Medical
Mediation Rules provided: "All conflicting rules and statutes are hereby superseded as of
the effective date of these Rules, and any statute not superseded shall remain in effect as a
rule promulgated by the Supreme Court." Id. at 547. The power to regulate matters of pro-
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The constitutional arguments against the Act were quickly as-
serted. A multi-faceted attack was made on the validity of the Act
in Carter v. Sparkman.1 ° After dismissing many of the arguments
as being unimportant and "without merit," the Florida Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act." In so doing, the
court rejected the argument that equal protection was violated be-
cause a plaintiff was required to proceed through the mediation
procedure while a defendant could avoid the process by not filing
an answer. The Act was construed to mean that if the physician
failed to participate in the hearing, his failure to participate would
be admissible into evidence at the subsequent civil trial."3 The
court also determined that the mediation procedure did not place
an unreasonable burden on an aggrieved person's right to access to
the courts that is guaranteed by the Florida Constitution. 4 The
court found that the "imminent danger [of] a drastic curtailment
in the availability of health care services" validated the legisla-
ture's exercise of its police power for the health and welfare of its
citizens.' " At the same time, the court stressed that "the pre-litiga-
tion burden cast upon the claimant reaches the outer limits of con-
stitutional tolerance."' 6 In another case, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected arguments that the Act had
abridged the plaintiffs equal protection, substantive and procedu-
ral due process and right to jury trial standards of the United
States Constitution. Nevertheless, only forty-five months after its
cedure is vested in the Florida Supreme Court. See FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 2, 13.
10. 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977). On July 31, 1975, the
defendant moved to have the circuit court dismiss a malpractice suit which had bypassed
the statutorily required mediation hearing and been filed directly in court. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss on the basis that the Act was unconstitutional. Id. at 804.
11. Id. at 806. Justice England, in his concurring opinion, analyzed the additional argu-
ments which had been made, but which were rejected without comment by the majority.
The defendants argued that the Act was constitutionally invalid because it abrogated a per-
son's "privilege to select a judicial forum" in violation of the privileges and immunities
clause and the due process clause of the 14th amendment of the United States Constitution;
it provided that judges serve on mediation panels rather than devote their full time to judi-
cial duties as required by art. V, § 13 of the Florida Constitution; and it violated the court's
rulemaking authority under art. V, § 2 of the Florida Constitution. Id. at 807-08.




16. Id. at 806.
17. Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979). The United States Court
of Appeals rejected arguments that the Act had abridged the plaintiff's constitutional rights
of equal protection and due process, and the right to a jury trial. The Court of Appeals
found that the Florida Legislature had a rational basis for the classifications established by
19801 .167
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decision in Carter v. Sparkman, the Florida Supreme Court read-
dressed the constitutional issues and found that the medical medi-
ation procedures were constitutionally invalid because the Act was
being applied to the litigants in an arbitrary and capricious
manner.
1 8
The purpose of this article is to examine the operation of medi-
cal mediation panels during their 1,704 day existence in Florida.
Appellate decisions which interpret various problems in the medi-
cal mediation process are analyzed. In addition, the results of a
statistical study of the malpractice claims filed in Florida's fifteen
largest counties during the three-year period from July 1, 1975 to
June 30, 1978 are analyzed to determine what actually occurred
during the medical mediation proceedings held during that period.
II. THE MEDICAL MEDIATION CLAIM
A. Claims Subject to Mediation
All claims for damages arising from the alleged malpractice of
any medical or osteopathic physician, podiatrist, hospital or health
maintenance organization were required to be submitted to a med-
ical mediation panel and the panel's jurisdiction terminated before
a complaint based on the claim could be filed in circuit court.1" If
the claim was filed directly with the circuit court without the sub-
mission of the claim to the mediation panel, the complaint in cir-
cuit court was subject to a motion to dismiss.2 0 Even in cases in
the Act, that the provisions did not significantly restrict access to court since a claimant
could file a court action after the conclusion of the mediation process, and that neither
substantive nor procedural due process was violated. Id. at 1175-79. The court specifically
rejected the following alleged violations of procedural due process:
(1) [T~he denial of access to the courts; (2) the delay in the filing of a court action
incident to the mediation process; (3) mandatory arbitration [the court carefully
distinguished the mediation required under the Florida Act from arbitration
which may be unconstitutional]; (4) the admission of panel findings in evidence at
a subsequent trial; and (5) a malpractice claimant's inability to voir dire prospec-
tive panel members.
Id. at 1175 n.19, 1176-77.
The Fifth Circuit held that Florida's mediation statutes must be applied by a federal
court in a diversity case. Id. at 1168-69.
18. Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980).
19. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(1)(a) (1979).
20. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(1)(a) (1979); see Mount Sinai Hosp. v. Wolfson, 327 So. 2d 883
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). In Jackson v. Biscayne Medical Center, Inc., 347 So. 2d 721
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), the court dismissed two counts of the complaint which dealt
with medical negligence because it had not been submitted to a mediation proceeding. How-
ever, other counts alleging intentional torts by the defendant hospital were allowed to pro-
ceed without mediation, even though it was alleged that all of the counts arose from one
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which the allegations of malpractice arose only in a third party
complaint, the mediation proceedings had to be concluded before
the third party complaint could be filed."1 As an example, if A sued
B for damages arising out of an automobile accident, B could not
file a third party complaint for contribution alleging that Dr. C's
malpractice had aggravated A's injury until a claim had been filed
before a medical mediation panel. The third party complaint
would be dismissed without affecting A's original action against B.
Malpractice claims which are litigated in federal court generally
are based on diversity jurisdiction and look to state law to supply
the substantive law relating to the alleged malpractice. The fifth
circuit found that in a diversity case in which the Florida substan-
tive malpractice law was applicable, a federal court would enforce
the requirement that a medical malpractice plaintiff first partici-
pate in a medical mediation proceeding in a Florida state court.2 2
The court found the mediation proceeding to be so intertwined
with Florida's substantive malpractice law that it should be recog-
nized in federal court in order to fully effectuate Florida's substan-
tive policy.2 The court also felt that not requiring participation in
the mediation proceeding would encourage forum-shopping by al-
lowing a nonresident plaintiff to choose whether to submit his mal-
practice claim to mediation through the selection of a federal or
state forum. 4
B. Proper Parties to the Mediation Claim
Mediation Rule 20.120(a) provided that "only those persons who
would be entitled to damages as the result of the alleged malprac-
transaction. Id. at 722. See also St. Vincent's Medical Center v. Oakley, 371 So. 2d 590 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (cause of action for assault arising out of false imprisonment).
In Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979), the court observed that in
federal court a stay of the proceeding would have been proper if the Florida mediation
proceeding had not been instituted. One Florida decision, Richards v. Foulk, 345 So. 2d 402
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), distinguished between the use of a judgment of dismissal and
a stay by the trial judge. The Richards court found it proper to dismiss the complaint if the
plaintiff intentionally evaded the jurisdiction of the mediation panel; however, when the
plaintiff's failure to follow the mediation procedure was due to mistake or inadvertence, the
court considered a stay of the malpractice action appropriate pending the mediation pro-
ceeding. Id. at 403. The trial judge was required to exercise his discretion to determine the
appropriate remedy. Id.
21. See Davis v. Acton, 373 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Walt Disney World
Co. v. Memorial Hosp., 363 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
22. Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1168-70 (5th Cir. 1979).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1170.
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tice" could be joined as claimants.2 5 On the other hand, under sec-
tion 768.44(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes,21 "any person. . . claim-
ing damages" because of the alleged malpractice of an enumerated
defendant was required to submit his claim to mediation. It might
have been argued that if the mediation claim on its face disclosed
that, as a matter of law, a person was not entitled to damages, he
would be properly included as a claimant under the statute but not
under the terms of the rule; that is, he would be a person "claim-
ing" damages, but not a person "entitled" to them. Other parts of
the statute, however, ensured that this distinction was not mate-
rial." For example, because a motion attacking the legal sufficiency
of the mediation claim was not a proper motion during a mediation
proceeding, 8 if a person alleged in her claim that the malpractice
of a named defendant had damaged her, a mediation hearing was
required.2 9 However, if a claim did not seek money damages for
malpractice, it was not necessary to proceed through the mediation
process. For instance, a suit seeking only injunctive relief could be
filed directly in circuit court.30
Medical or osteopathic physicians, podiatrists, hospitals and
health maintenance organizations were appropriate defendants in a
mediation claim, and a malpractice claim against any of them had
to be submitted to mediation." Nurses, dentists, chiropractors and
nursing homes were not included within the terms of the statute as
defendants against whom a malpractice mediation claim could or
had to be brought.3 2 The mediation requirement was not imposed
in malpractice actions against lawyers, accountants or other non-
medical professionals. If a plaintiff desired to name as a defendant
a person not enumerated in the statute, such as a nurse, a com-
25. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.120(a), 348 So. 2d 547, 549 (Fla. 1977)(emphasis added).
26. (1979)(emphasis added).
27. A defendant could not attack the substantive merits of a malpractice claim by a
motion. See footnotes 60-65 and accompanying text infra. Therefore, the prehearing defense
that the claim was insufficient was not available to the defendant. Also, under the supreme
court's order, the Rules of Medical Mediation Procedure superseded any conflicting statu-
tory provisions. In re The Florida Bar, 348 So. 2d 547, 547 (Fla. 1977).
28. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.090(e), 348 So. 2d 547, 548 (Fla. 1977). Neither was a motion for
summary judgment nor a motion for judgment on the pleadings a proper motion. Id. at
20.090(f); see note 66 infra.
29. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(1)(a) (1979).
30. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.050.
31. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(1)(a) (1979).
32. Young v. Bramlett, 369 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979). If a medical media-
tion claim was filed against a professional not included within the Act, the statute of limita-
tions was not tolled. Id. at 653. See notes 43, 44 infra.
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plaint could be filed directly in circuit court without going through
a mediation proceeding. 3 But, if a plaintiff desired to name a
nurse as one of a number of the co-defendants, the mediation pro-
ceeding would first have to be held for all defendants other than
the nurse. She could not be included in the mediation proceeding,
even if she or the plaintiff desired to do so. A complaint could sub-
sequently be filed in a civil malpractice action naming both the
nurse and the other co-defendants, but the statute of limitations
would have required the malpractice action against the nurse to be
filed at the same time as the mediation claim was filed against the
other defendants."'
Frequently, multiple defendants are named in a malpractice ac-
tion to ensure that the party who committed the allegedly negli-
gent act is included in the suit and to make it impossible for the
parties to cast the blame on one who is not present. Rule 20.120
recognized that multiple defendants could be named in a media-
tion proceeding and gave the plaintiff/claimant the option of filing
a single claim in which all of the defendants were included or of
filing separate claims against each of the defendants.3 5
C. The Mediation "Claim"
The pleading initiating a medical mediation proceeding was
called a "claim" rather than a complaint, and was required to be
filed with the clerk of the circuit court in the county in which there
was proper venue.3e The claim was served on the defendant in the
same manner as service of process is generally effected in a civil
suit, that is, by personal service. In addition, a copy of the claim
was required to be mailed to the defendant and to the administra-
tive board licensing the professional.3 7
In evaluating the facts which had to be included in the "claim,"
it seems clear that only notice pleading was necessary. A "short
33. See Walsh v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 376 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1979). In Walsh, the defendant's motion to dismiss a civil malpractice action was errone-
ously granted by the trial judge on the ground that the plaintiff had not submitted her
claim to a mediation panel. The court found that a defendant not enumerated in the Act
was not entitled to the protection of the Act. Therefore, it was unnecessary for the plaintiff
to file a mediation claim. Id. at 251-52.
34. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(a)-(b) (1979).
35. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.120(a)-(b), 348 So. 2d 547, 549 (Fla. 1977).
36. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(I)(b) (1979). See Largen v. Greenfield, 363 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
37. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.080, 348 So. 2d 547, 548 (Fla. 1977); FLA. STAT. § 768.44(I)(b)
(1979).
19801
172 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:165
and plain statement of the ultimate facts" describing the alleged
malpractice was required 8 In addition, the claim included the
designation of the medical specialty involved in the malpractice.39
A claimant could include more than one instance of malpractice
in his claim. If there were multiple instances by the same defen-
dant, they could be stated cumulatively or in the alternative. 0
When separate claims were filed by the same plaintiff against the
same defendant, the judicial referee had the discretion under rule
20.120(b) to consolidate them in one mediation proceeding.41
When a medical mediation claim was filed in circuit court, the
action was commenced42 and the applicable statute of limitations s
was tolled until the mediation panel issued a written decision or its
jurisdiction otherwise terminated." Section 768.44(4) provided
that after the jurisdiction of the panel had terminated, the plain-
tiff/claimant had sixty days in which to file a complaint in the cir-
cuit court. The section operated as a savings clause to extend the
time limit for filing a complaint in the circuit court, even though
the statute of limitations would have run during the time the me-
diation panel considered the claim.'6 If the time limit for filing the
cause of action extended more than sixty days from the date the
jurisdiction of the panel terminated, section 768.44(4) did not
shorten the time limit. The sixty-day provision operated to
lengthen the time period to insure that a plaintiff could adequately
prepare and file his complaint in circuit court upon learning of the
mediation panel's decision.' 6
38. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.060(a), 348 So. 2d 547, 548 (Fla. 1977). Similarly, both the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure generally require notice
pleading in civil cases. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b). See also Fla. R.
Med. P. Form 20.904, 348 So. 2d 547, 555 (Fla. 1977).
39. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.060(b), 348 So. 2d 547, 548 (Fla. 1977).
40. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.060(a), 348 So. 2d 547, 548 (Fla. 1977).
41. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.120(b), 348 So. 2d 547, 549 (Fla. 1977).
42. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.070, 348 So. 2d 547, 548 (Fla. 1977).
43. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(a)-(b) (1979). The two-year statute of limitations runs from the
time of the incident giving rise to the action or from the time the incident was discovered or
should have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence, whichever is later. In no event,
however, could the action be brought more than four years from the date of the incident. Id.
44. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(4) (1979). The panel's jurisdiction terminated ten months after
the claim was filed, even if a written decision had not been filed. The tolling effect ceased
when the jurisdiction terminated. See Valenstein v. Doctor's Hosp., 372 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (Schwartz, J., specially concurring).
45. Id. See Lustig v. McCormick, 358 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
46. See Enfield v. Held, 357 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Jones v. North
Dade Hosp., Inc., 359 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Chambers v. Gaul, 365 So. 2d
213 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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Unlike the practice under both the Federal and Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure, 7 a participant in a mediation proceeding was not
allowed to amend his pleading one time as a matter of right nor
was he given liberal leave to amend granted by the court. Rule
20.100(a) provided that a party could amend only upon order of
the judicial referee. If a party amended, the amendment related
back to the date of filing the original pleading and did not operate
to extend or increase the jurisdictional time limits of the mediation
panel. 4' Thus, the process of delaying a proceeding by numerous
amendments was strictly limited to ensure that the plaintiff was
not denied his right to a trial by jury for a time greater than that
specified in the rules and statute.
D. The Answer and Other Pleadings
Each named defendant in a mediation proceeding could file an
answer to the claim within twenty days of service of process.4 If an
answer was filed, the defendant was not allowed to claim in the
subsequent civil proceeding that the mediation panel lacked per-
sonal jurisdiction over him.50 The defendant could specify in the
answer the medical specialty he desired the physician member of
the mediation panel to possess. 1 If this designation was not in-
cluded in the answer, he filed a separate pleading designating a
medical specialist within thirty days after the service of process.52
If an answer was not filed within twenty days, the jurisdiction of
the mediation panel automatically terminated and the parties
could proceed "in accordance with law,"s i.e., the plaintiff could
file suit in circuit court.54 While the plaintiff was required to file a
mediation claim even though he did not desire to proceed to medi-
ation, the defendant clearly had a choice. If the defendant wished
to proceed with mediation, he filed his answer; if he did not wish
47. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a).
48. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.100(a)-(b), 348 So. 2d 547, 548 (Fla. 1977).
49. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(1)(c) (1979); Fla. R. Med. P. 20.090(a), 348 So. 2d 547, 548 (Fla.
1977).
50. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.090(g), 348 So. 2d 547, 548 (Fla. 1977).
51. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.090(b), 348 So. 2d 547, 548 (Fla. 1977).
52. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(2)(f) (1979).
53. Id. at § 768.44(1)(c). Fla. R. Med. P. 20.190(a), 348 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1977), re-
quired the clerk to send a notice of termination of the proceeding to the parties if no timely
answer was filed
54. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(1)(c) (1979). The fact that a defendant had elected not to partici-
pate was admissible as evidence in a subsequent malpractice trial. Carter v. Sparkman, 335
So. 2d 802, 805 (Fla. 1976). See text accompanying note 165 infra.
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to mediate, no answer was filed.6
The twenty-day time limit for filing an answer was strictly juris-
dictional and the appellate courts rejected equitable arguments to
extend it.56 Even when both parties agreed that the defendant doc-
tor could have more than twenty days to answer, the court would
not recognize the agreement because the jurisdictional time period
could not be waived by stipulation of counsel.51
When there were multiple defendants, some defendants might
file a timely answer and others might not. There was a split of
authority as to whether the mediation panel had jurisdiction in
this situation over a defendant who elected not to file an answer.
In Latorra v. Patrick,58 one defendant inadvertently filed his an-
swer in the wrong court while the remaining defendants filed their
answers correctly. The judicial referee entered an order terminat-
ing the panel's jurisdiction over the defendant who did not file an
answer. The fourth district affirmed on the grounds that the
twenty-day period was jurisdictional and that the judicial referee
had no discretion if an answer was not properly filed. 9 Under the
rationale of this decision, the claimant could initiate suit against a
single nonanswering defendant in circuit court while the mediation
process continued as to the other defendants. In Baptist Memorial
Hospital v. Beaty,60 however, only one of four defendants filed his
answer within twenty days. No hearing was held on the claim
against any of the defendants. The first district found that where a
claim was filed against several defendants, the filing of an answer
by one defendant provided jurisdiction for the panel as to all other
defendants included in the claim, regardless of whether the others
had filed an answer. 1 In reaching this conclusion, the Beaty court
focused on the second sentence of section 768.44(1)(c) which stated
that if no answer was filed within twenty days the jurisdiction of
the panel terminated. The court interpreted this language to mean
that the jurisdiction of the panel terminated only if no answer was
55. The constitutionality of this provision was upheld in Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d
at 805.
56. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(1)(c) (1979). See Latorra v. Patrick, 359 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (timely answer filed in wrong court); Scherer v. Liberto, 353 So. 2d 1224
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (answer mailed on twentieth day).
57. See Johnson v. Crawford, 361 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Howell v.
Allen, 361 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
58. 359 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
59. Id. at 464.
60. 364 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
61. Id. at 547.
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filed by any of the named defendants. The Beaty court reasoned
that any other reading of the statute would change its meaning,
and that this interpretation was logical because the plaintiff, by
filing a claim against several defendants, indicated a desire to bring
an action against them in one lawsuit.2 The court further reasoned
that to find otherwise would result in a multiplicity of lawsuits. A
contrary holding would require the claimant to file suit against the
nonparticipating defendant and to litigate that cause of action at
the same time that the mediation proceeding continued against the
defendant who filed an answer.63
Proper venue before the mediation panel was in the circuit
where the subsequent lawsuit would be ultimately filed, i.e., where
the defendant resided or where the cause of action occurred.4 Ap-
parently a motion for change of venue was recognized as long as it
was made upon or before filing the answer. If the issue was not
timely raised, a defendant waived his venue privilege. 5 The media-
tion rules did not clearly define which motions were permissible in
a mediation proceeding. However, they specifically prohibited mo-
tions for summary judgment, for judgment on the pleadings, for a
directed verdict,66 for a more definite statement, for failure to at-
62. Id. at 547-48.
63. Id. at 548. This decision involved the issue of whether the statute of limitations had
run, which would bar a subsequent civil malpractice suit. The Beaty court misconstrued the
effect of the rules and statute when it said that "[ulpon filing their claim with the mediation
panel, jurisdiction of the panel (in the absence of a hearing being held on the claim) ex-
tended for 10 months from the date the claim was filed . . . unless no answer was filed
within 20 days of the date of service." Id. at 547 (citation omitted). Because one of the
defendants filed a timely answer, the court found the statute of limitations was tolled for 10
months. The Beaty court overlooked the requirement that unless a hearing was held within
120 days from the date the claim was filed or an order entered extending that time period,
jurisdiction automatically terminated. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(3) (1979). See Thames v. Melvin,
365 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979); see generally notes 101-09 and accompanying
text infra. If the Beaty court had correctly interpreted the length of the panel's jurisdiction,
it would have found that the statute had run.
64. See FLA. STAT. § 47.011 (1979); Largen v. Greenfield, 363 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1978).
65. Largen v. Greenfield, 363 So. 2d 573, 574 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978). See State Bd.
of Regents v. Forsythe, 370 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Conard v. Mora, 362
So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978). The 120-day jurisdictional time period began to run
when the claim was filed with the clerk of the circuit court having proper venue. Conard,
362 So. 2d at 729.
66. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.090(f), 348 So. 2d 547, 548 (Fla. 1977) prohibited motions for
summary judgments, judgment on the pleadings, and directed verdicts. See Finnk v. Tan-
ner, 366 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (judicial referee had no authority to
dismiss a claim based on his finding that the claimant's testimony was not credible); How-
arth & Scott, P.A. v. Edwards, 353 So. 2d 175, 176 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (judicial
referee had no authority to grant a motion for summary judgment even when the statute of
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tach documents or exhibits, to attack the sufficiency of the Claim 67
or in answer to the claim.5 In permitting a motion for change of
venue, the second district reasoned that the bar to motions "filed
in answer to the claim" referred only to motions attacking the sub-
stantive merits of the claim.69 Other types of motions not specifi-
cally prohibited were allowed, such as motions to terminate the
panel's jurisdiction because of a jurisdictional time limit.70
The only pleadings permitted were the claim and the answer.
Other types of pleadings commonly used in civil actions, such as
replies, third party complaints, or cross-claims, were not available
in mediation proceedings."
Ill. THE MEDIATION PANEL
A. Selection
The mediation panel consisted of a judicial referee, a licensed
physician, and an attorney.72 The judicial referee was a circuit
judge who presided over the panel and was selected by the chief
circuit judge through a "blind" system of selection .7  The parties
to the mediation proceeding had no input into the judicial referee's
selection.
The first step in selecting the physician panelist was to establish
the panelist's specialty.74 The "claim" included a designation of
limitations had run before the mediation claim was filed); Floyd v. Goss, 352 So. 2d 1189,
1189 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (judicial referee had no authority to enter a judgment on
the pleadings even when the defense that the statute of limitations had run was not
disputed).
67. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.090(e), 348 So. 2d 547, 548 (Fla. 1977).
68. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.090(c), 348 So. 2d 547, 548 (Fla. 1977).
69. Largen v. Greenfield, 363 So. 2d 573, 574 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978). In Finnk v.
Tanner, 366 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), the court suggested that the judicial
referee may have the power to enter a dismissal or default when the claimant disobeyed
orders entered by the judicial referee and when the claim was "based on fraud, pretense,
collusion or other similar wrongdoing." Id. at 525.
70. See Thames v. Melvin, 370 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
71. See Fla. R. Med. P. 20.090(c)-(d), 348 So. 2d 547, 548 (Fla. 1977).
72. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(2) (1979). In Diggett v. Conkling, 368 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1979), the parties stipulated that the judicial referee could hold a hearing without the
other panel members participating. The court found that the panel could not act unless all
three members participated. Id. at 75. See also Grossman v. Duncan, 371 So. 2d 142 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (hearing was conducted before the judicial referee alone and there-
fore it was not the hearing contemplated by the applicable statute).
73. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(2) (1979).
74. Id. at § 768.44(2)(f). A podiatrist could not serve as a member of the panel because
the statutory provision only included "physicians" as possible panel members. When a mal-
practice claim was filed naming a podiatrist as a defendant, a medical doctor rather than a
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the speciality of the defendant committing the malpractice. 5 In
the case of multiple defendants, the claimant elected the type of
specialist he wanted on the panel. The defendant could designate
the specialty in his answer.7 If there were multiple defendants,
then each could file a designation of a different specialty. If the
parties did not designate the same Specialty, the judicial referee
determined the proper specialty of the panelist.77 There was no re-
quirement that the physician panelist be of the same specialty as
that specified by any of the defendants.
A standing list of licensed physicians and attorneys from whom
mediation panels were chosen was prepared by the chief judge.78
The physician's list, if possible, was divided into areas of medical
podiatrist served on the panel. See Bryant v. Tedder, 356 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1978); Morales v. Moore, 356 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978). In 1976, the statute
was amended to specifically include claims against podiatrists within the mediation process.
Ch. 76-260, § 7, 1976 Fla. Laws 660 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.44(1)(a) (1979)).
The amendment did not add podiatrists to the persons who were qualified to serve on the
mediation panel.
75. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.060(b), 348 So. 2d 547, 548 (Fla. 1977). Although Florida Statutes
provided that the parties must file a document designating the panelist's specialty within 30
days of service of process, the mediation rules required the designation in the "claim" filed
by the patient to initiate the mediation process. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(2)(f) (1979); Fla. R.
Med. P. 20.070, 348 So. 2d 547, 548 (Fla. 1977).
76. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.090(b); 348 So. 2d 547, 548 (Fla. 1977).
77. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.210, 348 So. 2d 547, 551 (Fla. 1977), required the clerk to immedi-
ately set a hearing before the referee to determine the proper specialty when different spe-
cialties were designated.
The following statistics concerning the frequency of stipulation were compiled from the
survey discussed later in the article.
TABLE 1
Date Mediation Claim Filed
Through
June30,
1975 1976 1977 1978 Total
Number of claims in which
specialty of physician/
panelist stipulated by parties 88 326 275 108 797
Percentage of claims in which
specialty of physician/
panelist stipulated by parties 34.8 38.7 37.1 33.2 36.9
78. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(2)(a)-(b) (1979). The standing lists were made by the chief judge
who could accept the recommendations of recognized professional medical and legal socie-
ties. Id. There was no suggestion as to the specific number of names to be included on each
list.
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specialty.79 If the parties could agree upon a doctor, an attorney, or
both, to serve upon the panel, their stipulation as to the panelist
was followed. 0 The statute was not clear as to whether a stipu-
lated panelist must have been on the approved list. It would seem
that if the parties agreed to a panelist who was not included on the
chief judge's list, and if that person had no objection, the court
would have little reason to exclude the person from the panel.
A stipulation between the parties as to the names of the panel
members needed to be reached within ten days after the determi-
nation of the medical specialty to be represented on the hearing
panel. If the parties could not agree, then the clerk mailed to each
party the names of five attorneys and five doctors whom he se-
lected at random from the list of panel members previously com-
piled by the chief judge.81 At the same time, the clerk also sent a
notice and an information questionnaire to each of the five attor-
neys and five doctors that had been chosen as prospective panel
members. The questionnaire elicited information regarding the ed-
ucation, professional background and experience of each prospec-
tive panel member, as well as any association the prospective
79. Id. at § 768.44(2)(a).
80. Id. at § 768.44(2)(g). The following statistics concerning the frequency of stipulation
were compiled from the survey discussed later in the article.
TABLE 2
Date Mediation Claim Filed
Through
June 30,
1975 1976 1977 1978 Total
Number of claims in which
identity of physician/
panelist stipulated by parties 59 231 202 92 584
Percentage of claims in which
identity of physician/
panelist stipulated by parties 23.3 27.4 27.3 28.3 27.0
Number of claims in which
identity of attorney/
panelist stipulated by parties 59 231 200 88 578
Percentage of claims in which
identity of attorney/
panelist stipulated by parties 23.3 27.4 27.0 27.1 26.7
81. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(2)(g) (1979).
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member may have had with the parties to the claim.2
The statute was not clear regarding who had access to the ques-
tionnaires after they were returned to the clerk. Since challenges
for cause to a prospective panel member were allowed, 83 it would
seem that the chief purpose for these questionnaires was to give
the parties information to help them determine if any prospective
panel member should be disqualified. However, since a provision in
a draft of rule 20.130(a) reading "[tihe clerk shall make available
to the parties the answers to the questionnaires" was unanimously
stricken by the rules committee,84 and not included in the rule as
adopted by the supreme court, 85 it appears that the intent was to
make these questionnaires unavailable to the parties. In practice,
the questionnaires were available to the attorney before the selec-
tion of the panelists just as jury questionnaires are in a criminal or
civil trial.
If the questionnaire did not completely disclose a prospective
panel member's background, the judicial referee could authorize
the submission of additional questions to the panel member upon
application of any party.86 The application was required to be
made within ten days of the mailing to the parties of the names of
the prospective panel members, and the answers to the additional
questions had to be returned to the clerk within ten days of the
mailing.8 7
When a prospective panel member received a notice that he had
been chosen to serve on a mediation panel, he had ten days to dis-
qualify himself 8 No reason need have been given for this disquali-
fication. The parties also had ten days within which to challenge a
prospective panel member for cause, which challenge was made
and filed with the clerk. 9 The clerk automatically set a hearing
82. Id., Fla. R. Med. P. 20.130(a), 348 So. 2d 547, 549 (Fla. 1977). The form of the physi-
cian's questionnaire is set forth in Fla. R. Med. P. Form 20.902, 348 So. 2d 547, 552-53 (Fla.
1977); and the attorney's questionnaire is set forth in Fla. R. Med. P. Form 20.903, 348 So.
2d 547, 554 (Fla. 1977).
83. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(2)(d) (1979).
84. Minutes of the Civil Procedure Rules Committee of The Florida Bar, p. 2 (January
21, 1977)(on file with Professor Ehrhardt, Florida State University College of Law, Tallahas-
see, Fla.).
85. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.130(a), 348 So. 2d 547, 549 (Fla. 1977).
86. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.130(b), 348 So. 2d 547, 549 (Fla. 1977).
87. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.130(b)-(c), 348 So. 2d 547, 549 (Fla. 1977).
88. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(2)(g) (1979).
89. Id., Fla. R. Med. P. 210(d), 348 So. 2d 547, 551 (Fla. 1977). Although the Act was not
clear as to when the 10-day period began to run, Form 20.905, approved by the supreme
court, provided that it ran from the date of mailing. 348 So. 2d at 556.
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before the judicial referee whenever a challenge for cause was
filed.90 However, if the parties informally agreed on the disposition
of the challenge, it was not heard by the judicial referee. 91
When a prospective panel member disqualified himself or was
successfully challenged for cause, the clerk appointed an additional
prospective panel member. Notices were mailed to the attorneys
for the parties and questionnaires were mailed to the prospective
panel members. The process of disqualification and challenge was
repeated until a panel of five attorneys and five physicians was
selected.92
From the final list of five physicians and five attorneys, the par-
ties chose one attorney and one doctor to serve on the panel. 8 This
selection was made during a conference scheduled by the clerk in
which the parties could informally agree on the panel members. If
informal agreement was not reached, a process of striking names
was used until a panel member was selected. The claimant first
struck a name. The strikes alternated until only one name re-
mained.94 The same process was repeated in selecting a physician.
The rules did not set forth the procedure to be followed if multiple
defendants could not agree on the name to be stricken. Appar-
ently, the judicial referee, through the exercise of his discretion,
ordered a fair and equitable process in determining the name to be
stricken. For instance, the defendants could decide each strike by
majority vote or, if there were only two defendants, each could be
allowed to exercise one strike.
After the parties had selected the attorney and the physician
members of the panel, either the judicial referee or a party could
question the physician and attorney to determine whether either
had a state of mind regarding the claim of the parties that would
prevent him from acting impartially. If the judicial referee deter-
mined that a panelist could not act impartially, he removed the
panelist.95 Neither the statute nor the rule provided a procedure
for the replacement of a panelist who was removed at this point.
Presumably the initial selection process began again with the clerk
90. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.210(d), 348 So. 2d 547, 551 (Fla. 1977). If a challenge for cause
was not timely made, it was waived. See Pyle v. Taylor, 361 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1978).
91. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(2)(g) (1979).
92. Id.; Fla. R. Med. P. 20.210(e), 348 So. 2d 547, 551 (Fla. 1977).
93. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(2)(g) (1979); Fla. R. Med. P. 20.210(e), 348 So. 2d 547, 551 (Fla.
1977).
94. Id.
95. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(2)(h) (1979).
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making a random selection and mailing questionnaires.
B. Statutory Time Limits - The Traps for the Unwary
The medical mediation rules and statutes established several im-
portant time limit provisions." Because the Act was in derogation
of the common law and was an impediment to the constitutional
guarantee of access to the courts, these time limit provisions were
generally interpreted as being jurisdictional and therefore were
strictly construed.9 7 In adopting Mediation Rule 20.190, the su-
preme court made it clear that it interpreted these provisions as
being jurisdictional. If the time limit expired without certain ac-
tions having occurred, the mediation panel automatically lost its
subject-matter jurisdiction, and the equities involved in the expira-
tion of the time limit were not considered.9 s Even if the opposing
counsel agreed to an action that led to noncompliance with a cer-
tain time provision, that agreement generally did not operate as a
waiver.99
1. The Twenty-Day Period
An answer was required to be filed within twenty days of the
date of service of process. If an answer was not timely filed, sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction of the hearing panel automatically termi-
nated and could not be extended, even by the actions of the
parties. 1°°
96. The mechanism for computing time was similar to that set forth in the FLA. R. Civ.
P. 1.090. The day of the act from which the designated period of time began to run was not
included. The last day of the time period was included unless it was a Saturday or Sunday
or legal holiday. In that case, the period ran until the end of the next day which was not a
Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. If the period of time prescribed was less than seven days,
intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays were not included. If a rule or statute
required an act to be done and no specific time period was stated the act had to be done
within 10 days. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.160(a)-(b), 348 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1977).
97. See, e.g., Ballard v. Curatolo, 363 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Green v.
Broward Gen. Medical Center, 356 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978),
98. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.190, 348 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1977).
99. See Johnson v. Crawford, 361 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Howell v.
Allen, 361 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
100. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(1)(c) (1979); Fla. R. Med. P. 20.190(a), 348 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla.
1977). See Latorra v. Patrick, 359 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Johnson v.
Crawford, 361 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Howell v. Allen, 361 So. 2d 791 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Scherer v. Liberto, 353 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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2. The 120-Day Period
A hearing on the mediation claim was required to be held within
120 days of the date that the claim was filed, unless the judicial
referee extended the time for good cause shown. 10 1 The party re-
questing the extension had to move for an extension and make a
showing of good cause prior to the expiration of the 120-day pe-
riod. 10 2 The motion to extend had to be granted within the 120
days. If it was only set for hearing within this period, then the
jurisdiction terminated.10 3 Apparently, if the motion to extend was
orally granted in a timely manner, jurisdiction was not lost simply
because the written order was not entered within 120 days.104 The
120-day period was jurisdictional and could not be extended by the
actions of the parties.105
It was uncertain whether jurisdiction terminated if a hearing was
begun, but not completed within the 120-day period. The most log-
ical interpretation is that the hearing must have been completed
within the time period. Rule 20.190(b) required that the hearing be
"held" within the 120-day period.10 6 When the referee extended
the 120-day period, rule 20.190(c) required that the hearing be
101. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(3) (1979). The order of extension had to be in writing. Fla. R.
Med. P. 20.160(c), 348 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1977). The 120-day period began to run when
the claim was filed in the county having proper venue. Conard v. Mora, 362 So. 2d 728 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
102. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.160(e), .190(b), 348 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1977). A motion to
extend the time for hearing could not be made after the termination of the 120-day period.
See Ballard v. Curatolo, 363 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978). But see Thames v.
Melvin, 365 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979) where the court found a referee's order,
made within the 120-day period, which set the final hearing outside the 120-day period, to
be an order extending the time for hearing, with good cause shown. However, shortly after
this decision was filed, thi same three-judge panel of the first district found that the holding
in Thames was strictly limited to its facts. Grossman v. Duncan, 371 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
103. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.190(b), 348 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1977). This rule required the
clerk to send a notice of termination of the proceedings to the parties if the 120-day period
had expired and no extension order was entered. Therefore, even if a motion to extend was
pending, the clerk was required to terminate the proceedings.
104. See State v. Smith, 369 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
105. See Thames v. Melvin, 365 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Mercy Hosp.,
Inc. v. Badia, 348 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977). However, in Limond v. Llanio,
349 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), a motion to extend the time for hearing was
pending at the expiration of the 120-day period. The opinion incorrectly held that the
panel's jurisdiction always lasted 10 months and therefore an order terminating jurisdiction
after the expiration of the 120 days was erroneous. See also Richards v. Foulk, 345 So. 2d
402 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
106. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.190(b), 348 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1977).
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"commenced" within six months of the date the claim was filed. 10 7
It seems that if the rule meant only that the hearing must have
begun within the 120-day period, the court would have used the
word "commence" as it did in rule 20.190(c). 0 8
It was unclear whether an order extending the time for a hearing
or only the motion showing good cause had to be entered within
the 120-day period. If jurisdiction automatically terminated at the
expiration of 120 days, it would seem that the court would lack
jurisdiction to do any act, including the entry of an order ex-
tending jurisdiction, once the deadline for filing was past.109
3. The Six-Month Period
When the judicial referee entered an order extending the 120-
day period within which a hearing was to be held, the hearing was
required to begin within six months from the date the claim was
filed. 110 If a hearing did not commence within six months, the sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction of the mediation panel automatically ter-
minated and could not be modified by the parties or by the judicial
referee. If the 120-day period was not extended in a timely man-
ner, the six-month period did not become effective.'
Occasionally a party attempted to evade this requirement by
holding a "commencement hearing" within the six-month period.
Limited evidence would be introduced and a hearing date would
again be set, but beyond the six-month period. This dilatory tactic
was disapproved and the court generally required a full hearing to
begin." '2 For example, in Hewitt v. Coffee,'" the judicial referee
granted defendant's motion to limit a previously set hearing to
permit only the introduction of medical records. A five-minute
hearing was held for this purpose. The claimant objected on the
ground that it was not a final hearing or one on the merits. The
Hewitt court held that the limited hearing was not a commence-
107. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.190(c), 348 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1977).
108. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.160(e), 348 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1977), also said that the hearing
"shall be begun no later than six months" from the day of filing.
109. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.190, 348 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1977).
110. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.160(e), 20.190(c), 348 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1977). The hearing
had to be held before all three panel members. See Diggett v. Conkling, 368 So. 2d 74 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
111. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.190(b), (c), 348 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1977).
112. See Shore v. Abbazia, 375 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (a hearing at
which only one medical record was introduced); Wright v. Ratnesar, 373 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (the only evidence offered was inadmissible hospital records).
113. 368 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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ment of a final hearing and dismissed the action because six
months had run from the date the claim was filed."' The opinion
focused on the fact that the claimant had not been permitted to
make an opening statement or call any witnesses. The court looked
to substance rather than form and found the hearing to be a device
to extend the six-month period.
11 5
Prior to the enactment of the Rules of Medical Mediation Proce-
dure, the Third District Court of Appeal considered whether it was
possible to waive this six-month time limitation. In Love v. Jacob-
son,11 6 an order had been entered extending the time for hearing to
six months. After the expiration of that period, the claimant tried
to terminate the jurisdiction of the panel. The Jacobson court rea-
soned that the statute, by providing for termination of jurisdiction
when no hearing was held within the ten-month period, also pro-
vided that subject-matter jurisdiction existed in the mediation
panel until the expiration of the ten-month period. Therefore, the
jurisdiction did not terminate after only six months.117 However,
subsequent to this decision 1 8 the supreme court adopted Media-
tion Rule 20.190(c), which provided that the six-month period was
jurisdictional, and the actions of the parties could not extend it if
the hearing had not begun within that time period.119 For instance,
in Raedel v. Watson Clinic Foundation, Inc.,20 the judicial referee
entered an order within the 120-day period pursuant to a stipula-
tion by the parties which extended the date for the final hearing
beyond the six-month period. The second district held that the
panel's jurisdiction had terminated and the final hearing could not
be held because no extension of the six-month period was permis-
sible under the rule. The lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pre-
cluded the panel from considering the merits of the claim."'1
114. Id. at 1345.
115. Id.
116. 343 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
117. Id.
118. The opinion in Jacobson was filed March 29, 1977, 343 So. 2d at 1328, while the
Rules of Mediation Procedure were filed on July 14, 1977. In re The Florida Bar, 348 So. 2d
547 (Fla. 1977).
119. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.190(c), 348 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1977).
120. 360 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978). The court noted that the only situation
where a mediation time limit could be extended was an extension of the 120-day limitation
to six months. Id. at 14.
121. Id. at 14-15. See, e.g., Feinstein v. Brown, 370 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1979); Burchett v. Clontz, 363 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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4. The Ten-Month Period
Mediation Rule 20.190 provided that if the judicial referee
granted an extension of the 120-day time period, the hearing had
to commence within six months from the date the claim was filed,
but that subject-matter jurisdiction did not terminate until ten
months from the date of filing.122 This rule recognized that al-
though a hearing was commenced in many mediation proceedings,
a valid reason could render it impossible to conclude the hearing
within the six-month period. To illustrate, if the hearing unexpect-
edly lasted more than a day, at least one of the panel members was
likely to have a conflict and be unable to meet the following day.
The hearing would then be continued to a date on which counsel
and each of the panel members had no conflict. Because of busy
schedules, this date may not have been in the near future. The ten-
month rule provided the ultimate limit beyond which an injured
claimant could not be denied the right to file a malpractice action
in the circuit court.123
Four of the district courts of appeal considered whether the ten-
month limit was jurisdictional or whether there were some circum-
stances under which the mediation panel could hear the claim be-
yond the ten-month period.1 2 4 The first decisions were filed shortly
after the constitutionality of the malpractice act was unsticcess-
fully challenged. Several judicial referees had decided to stay me-
diation proceedings pending a final determination of the constitu-
tionality of the underlying medical malpractice statute. The ten-
month period elapsed before the supreme court's decision in
Carter v. Sparkman was rendered.
Both the Second and Third District Courts of Appeal were sub-
sequently faced with the issue of whether the ten-month period
was jurisdictional or whether a mediation panel could retain juris-
diction. Both courts recognized a very narrow exception and pro-
vided that in this particular circumstance, the expiration of the
ten-month period did not result in the termination of the jurisdic-
122. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.190, 348 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1977). The panel was required to
file a written decision within thirty days after the completion of the hearing. FLA. STAT. §
768.44(7) (1979). Apparently, this decision had to be filed within the 10-month period or the
panel lost its jurisdiction to do so. See Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980).
123. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.190(d), 348 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1977); FLA. STAT. § 768.44(3)
(1979).
124. See, e.g., Perkins v. Pare, 352 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977), holding that
the 10-month limitation could not be "extended, modified or reinstated by the panel, the
judicial referee or by agreement of the parties." Id. at 67.
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tion of a mediation panel. 126 In considering the same issue, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal came to an opposite conclusion
and held that the panel's subject-matter jurisdiction terminated
after ten months even though the mediation proceeding had been
stayed pending the decision on the Act's constitutionality.""
Subsequently, Mediation Rule 20.190 was adopted. It clearly
provided that jurisdiction automatically terminated with the expi-
ration of ten months.1 7 After the adoption of the Mediation Rules,
the Second and Third District Courts of Appeal reviewed the issue
of whether the ten-month time period could be extended. In Love
v. Jacobson,128 the third district clearly held that if a hearing had
not been concluded within ten months from the date the claim was
filed because of the alleged delaying tactics of the claimants, the
panel's jurisdiction terminated. The court noted that its prior deci-
sions were strictly limited to the facts of those cases.129 In Febles v.
Abercrombie,8" the second district considered a case in which the
judicial referee had become unavailable and the hearing could not
be rescheduled within the ten-month period. The court declined to
extend its earlier decision and ruled that jurisdiction automatically
terminated after ten months.18 Similarly the First District Court
125. See State ex rel. Lund v. Keough, 352 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977);
State ex rel. Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Vann, 342 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); State
ex rel. McGuirk v. Cowart, 344 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
126. Cole v. Wallace, 354 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977). The court reasoned:
"The jurisdiction of a medical mediation panel terminates as a matter of law if a hearing
has not been held at the expiration of the ten-month jurisdictional period." Id. at 887 (em-
phasis in the original).
127. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.190, 348 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1977), stated in part:
The clerk shall send to all parties a notice of termination of the proceedings when
any of the following events has occurred:
(d) The final hearing has not been concluded within 10 months from the date
the claim is filed.
Termination for any of the foregoing reasons terminates the jurisdiction of the
panel.
If rule 20.190 had been applicable when the judicial referees stayed the mediation proceed-
ings beyond the 10-month period pending the outcome of the Florida Supreme Court's deci-
sion on the constitutionality of the Act, the jurisdiction of the panels would have termi-
nated. In Cole v. Burrows, 364 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), the panel's
jurisdiction terminated even though the death of a panel member prevented the hearing
from being held in a timely manner.
128. 358 So. 2d 1179, 1180 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
129. Id. at 1181. See Valenstein v. Doctors Hosp., 372 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (Schwartz, J., specially concurring).
130. 358 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
131. Id. at 569.
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of Appeal in Aldana v. Holub"3 2 held that regardless of the reason
that a hearing was not concluded within the ten-month period, the
panel's subject-matter jurisdiction automatically terminated. In
that decision, the court found that because of the expiration of the
ten-month period it was not necessary to reach the question of
whether the judicial referee had erred in granting a mistrial which
resulted in an inability to reschedule the hearing within the ten-
month time period.83  In its decision holding the Act to be consti-
tutionally invalid, the supreme court agreed that the ten-month
limit was jurisdictional and could not be extended. 13 4
5. Tolling Effect of Appeals
If a party appealed an order of the judicial referee, the appellate
process could result in the mediation panel losing jurisdiction. The
decisions seem clear that if, for any reason, a proceeding before a
mediation panel was not completed within ten months from the
date that a claim was filed, subject-matter jurisdiction automati-
cally terminated. 13 5 Whenever a party appealed an order, the ap-
peal process consumed a substantial amount of time; the ten-
month time period could expire during the pendency of the appeal
and jurisdiction of the mediation panel would then terminate. In
this event, a party could receive a favorable ruling, but be unable
132. 354 So. 2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 381 So.
2d 231 (Fla. 1980). See Thames v. Melvin, 370 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Pyle
v. Taylor, 361 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978). The Thames court found upon
expiration of the 10-month period, the panel's jurisdiction terminated. 370 So. 2d at 440.
The 10-month period had run during the time appellant successfully appealed an earlier
order of the judicial referee which had erroneously terminated the mediation proceeding.
Although the defendant obtained a determination by the appellate court that the proceed-
ing should not have been dismissed, the passage of the time involved in the appellate pro-
cess resulted in the panel losing jurisdiction under the 10-month rule. Id.
133. 354 So. 2d at 1273.
134. Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231, 235 (Fla. 1980); Fla. R. Med. P. 20.190, 348 So. 2d
547, 550 (Fla. 1977). See Cole v. Wallace, 354 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977);
Perkins v. Pare, 352 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977); State ex rel. Lund v. Keough,
352 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); State ex rel. McGurk v. Cowart, 344 So. 2d 624
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); State ex rel. Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Vann, 342 So. 2d 1073 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
135. An analogous situation involves a motion to vacate and set aside a judgment on the
basis of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, and newly discovered evidence
under FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b). The motion must be made not later than one year after the
judgment. Id. If an appeal is taken from a final order, the one-year period is not tolled.
When the appellate process extends over one year and a rule 1.540 motion is filed, it will not
be considered because it is not timely. See Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. George Constr..Co., 153
So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963); H. TRAWICK, FLORIDA PRACTI E & PROcEDURE § 26-8
(1976).
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to proceed in mediation because of the expiration of the ten-month
period.13 6 The reason for this seemingly harsh result was to insure
that a malpractice claimant was not deprived of his right to file a
complaint in circuit court for any longer than ten months.8 7 If the
rule was not interpreted strictly, either party could indefinitely ex-
tend the jurisdiction of the panel by filing appeals.
The only possible relief available to a party who desired to ap-
peal was to obtain a stay. Although the decisions seem clear that
there was no method of extending the ten-month period, 38 a few
cases suggested that a stay was available to toll the running of the
ten-month period.'5 9 Application for a stay had to be made to the
judicial referee.14 0 If the stay was denied, an appellate court, upon
motion, could review the denial of the stay.14 1
C. The Conduct of the Hearing
The hearing before the medical mediation panel was conducted
in a manner similar to that used in some arbitration proceedings
and before some administrative panels. The judicial referee. pre-
sided and ruled on matters of law and the admissibility of evi-
dence. The other panel members functioned as fact finders al-
though they were permitted to question the witnesses.14  During
the hearing, the parties were permitted to call witnesses who testi-
fied under oath subject to cross-examination." 3 Testimony could
136. See, e.g., Thames v. Melvin, 370 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979). In
Thames, the defendant successfully appealed the referee's order dismissing the mediation
proceeding because the 120-day period had run without a timely order extending it. Al-
though the court found that the jurisdiction had continued, the mediation claim was dis-
missed since the 10-month period had run during the appellate process.
137. Aldana, 381 So. 2d at 235.
138. See, e.g., Aldana, 354 So. 2d at 1273.
139. See Thames v. Melvin, 370 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Morales v.
Moore, 356 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
140. FLA. R. App. P. 9.310(a); Thames v. Melvin, 370 So. 2d 439, 440 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1979). A stay pending review is automatic only when the order is for the payment of
money or when the state or any public officer appeals. FLA. R. App. P. 9.310(b). See Angerer,
Stays and Post Trial Release, and Patterson & Livingston, Interlocutory Appeals in FLOR-
IDA APPELLATE PRACTICE 111-16, 172-73 (1978).
141. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.310(0.
142. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.170, 348 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1977). The judicial referee had the
discretion to permit the other panelists to question witnesses. It is clear that the mediation
rules did not permit the other panel members to overrule the judicial referee on questions as
to the admissibility of evidence. See Minutes of the Civil Procedure Rules Committee of
The Florida Bar, p. 8 (November 19, 1976)(on file with Professor Ehrhardt, Florida State
University College of Law, Tallahassee, Fla.).
143. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(6) (1979).
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also be offered through depositions and documentary evidence
could be considered by the panel."" The subpoena power of the
court was available.1 4 5 Nevertheless, the statute and rules provided
that strict adherence to the rules of civil procedure and to the rules
of evidence applicable in civil cases was not required. Thus, the
judicial referee could admit hearsay and other evidence for which a
technical foundation had not been laid if he found it to be relevant
and reliable. 1"
The major issue that arose in connection with the conduct of the
hearing was whether the claimant was required to present evidence
to the panel. In Herrera v. Doctors Hospital,147 the claimant
presented no evidence before the panel and the panel found that
the defendants were not actionably negligent. When the claimant
subsequently filed his suit in circuit court, the defendants moved
to dismiss on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction because
the claimant had presented no evidence to the mediation panel.14 8
The supreme court ruled that the complaint should not be dis-
missed because under the Act a plaintiff was not required to sub-
mit any evidence to the panel.14 9 The supreme court found that the
statute only required that the claim be "submitted" to mediation,
which occurred automatically when the claim form containing a
statement of the facts describing the alleged malpractice was filed
in the circuit court.18 0
The court found it unnecessary to require the presentation of
evidence before the panel due to what it found to be "substantial
obstacles" in sections 768.44(7) and 768.47 of the Florida Statutes,
to the plaintiff who presented no evidence.151 Section 768.47(2) al-
144. Id. The parties could use any of the discovery procedures provided by the Rules of
Civil Procedure, subject to certain time modifications. Id. at § 768.44(5); Fla. R. Med. P.
20.140(a), 348 So. 2d 547, 549 (Fla. 1977). The judicial referee had the power to limit discov-
ery, FLA. STAT. § 768.44(5) (1979), and to impose certain sanctions for noncompliance with
discovery orders, Fla. R. Med. P. 20.140(b), 348 So. 2d 547, 549 (Fla. 1977). In Taylor v.
Munroe Memorial Hosp., 362 So. 2d 142, 143-44 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978), the court
found the entry of a default judgment was proper when a party repeatedly failed to answer
certain interrogatories. Subsequently, Mediation Rule 20.140(b) was promulgated, which
provided that FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380, authorizing the entry of a default for the failure to
furnish discovery, was not applicable in mediation proceedings.
145. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(5) (1979).
146. Id. at § 768.44(6) (1979); Fla. R. Med. P. 20.170, 348 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1977).
147. 360 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Fisher v. Herrera, 367
So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1979).
148. 360 So. 2d at 1093.
149. 367 So. 2d at 206.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 206-07. Judge Pearson dissented from the opinion of the third district. He
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lowed only the panel's conclusion as to liability to be admitted into
evidence at trial, and section 768.44(7) limited the panel's conclu-
sion to a finding that the defendant "was actionably negligent" or
"was not actionably negligent."'' Presumably, if the claimant
presented no evidence the defendant could be found not actionably
negligent.8 3 Then the claimant would be forced to overcome this
finding at trial.
Within thirty days after the completion of the hearing, the panel
was required to file a written decision with the clerk, who then
mailed copies to the parties. The decision simply stated whether or
not there was actionable negligence on the part of each of the
defendants.1 4
If the parties desired they could continue mediation for the pur-
pose of having the panel make a recommendation regarding the
damages suffered by the claimant, although any determination of
punitive damages was specifically prohibited. 55 The recommenda-
tion was required to contain findings as to the damage caused by
each act involved. Any finding regarding damages was inadmissible
during a subsequent trial. Its only purpose was to facilitate a set-
tlement between the parties.1s5
IV. APPELLATE REVIEW
Decisions of the mediation panel relating to its jurisdiction to
hear the plaintiff's claim under section 768.44 were reviewed by
appellate courts. 5 7 Although both the statute and the mediation
argued that the Act required good faith compliance with the statute and that to allow a
claimant to proceed without presenting evidence would make a sham of the mediation pro-
cedure. 360 So. 2d at 1097-98.
152. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(7), .47(2) (1979).
153. See Herrera v. Doctors Hosp., 360 So. 2d 1092, 1096 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
154. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(7) (1979). Any panel member could file a written concurring or
dissenting opinion. Id. However, in Kirkley v. Behe, 381 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1979), the 30-day requirement was held not to be jurisdictional and a written decision was
permitted after 30 days if it was made orally in a timely manner.
For a discussion of whether the claimant can inform the jury that he presented no evi-
dence to the mediation panel, see notes 177-81 and accompanying text infra.
155. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(8) (1979). It appears that the panel was seldom asked to make a
damage recommendation. In a study conducted during the summer of 1979, discussed in
part VII of this article, infra, one of the items included in the questionnaire was whether
the mediation panel had been asked to render an advisory opinion as to the amount of
damages suffered by the claimant. Of the 789 hearings studied, none addressed itself to the
question of damages.
156. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(8) (1979).
157. Generally review was by a common law writ of certiorari. See Cole v. Wallace, 354
So. 2d 885 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Perkins v. Pare, 352 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
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rules were silent on the method of appellate review of a panel de-
termination, the courts permitted appeals involving subject-matter
jurisdiction but denied appeals for other issues not involving fun-
damental jurisdictional questions. " For instance, decisions of the
judicial referee on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
panel's factual finding were not reviewable by an appellate court." 9
The courts declined review of these issues on the ground that they
did not go to the integrity of the Act and that the party had an
adequate legal remedy at trial.' 60 On the other hand, the purpose
of the Act would have been frustrated if the jurisdiction of the
panel could have been erroneously defeated or maintained. 16
Courts also reviewed issues involving compliance with the Act's
strict time limits," 2 the selection of unqualified members of the
mediation panel' 63 and the termination of the panel's jurisdiction
by unauthorized means, i.e., entry of a judgment on the pieadings
App. 1977). But prohibition and mandamus were also utilized. See Stanton v. Community
Hosp., 359 So.. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); State ex rel. Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Vann,
342 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
Although appellate review may have been available, the process could consume so much
time that the mediation panel's jurisdiction was terminated by the expiration of the time
limit. One district court of appeal suggested that only the entry of a stay would toll the
running of the jurisdictional period. See Thames v. Melvin, 370 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1979).
158. The Florida Supreme Court held in Simmons v. Faust, 358 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 1978),
that an order of a judicial referee on the constitutionality of a statute was not an order of a
trial court. Id. If it had been an order of the trial court, it would have been appealable to
the supreme court. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3 (b)(1). The Simmons court also held that a judi-
cial referee did not perform the essential functions of a court and therefore, the referee's
orders were not appealable. 358 So. 2d at 1359. Also, a referee does not have the authority to
certify questions of law to the district court of appeal. Koota v. Parkway Gen. Hosp. Inc.,
347 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
159. See Hospital Corp. of America v. Lawyer, 363 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1978); Ans v. Pagnotti, 362 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
160. See Hubacher v. Landry, 360 So. 2d 42, 44 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978). The party
has an adequate remedy at trial because he can make a timely objection to the proferred
evidence.
161. Id. This decision also argued that if a medical defendant could obtain review of
nonjurisdictional matters, he could postpone the mediation proceedings and increase the
plaintiff's prelitigation burden beyond constitutional tolerance. Id. at 44-45.
162. See Valenstein v. Doctors Hosp., 372 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
(Schwartz, J., specially concurring); Thames v. Melvin, 370 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1979); Feinstein v. Brown, 370 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Burchett v.
Clontz, 363 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Pyle v. Taylor, 361 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Raedel v. Watson Clinic Foundation, Inc., 360 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1978); Febles v. Abercrombie, 358 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Love v.
Jacobson, 358 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Aldana v. Holub, 354 So. 2d 1272
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980).
163. See, e.g., Morales v. Moore, 356 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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or a summary judgment. a4
V. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE REGARDING MEDIATION
PROCEEDING AT SUBSEQUENT TRIAL
During the trial of the civil malpractice action in circuit court,
either the plaintiff or the defendant may have wished to introduce
evidence of certain aspects of the mediation proceeding. In addi-
tion to being governed by the usual rules of evidence, the admissi-
bility of evidence in mediation proceedings was also restricted by
certain specific provisions established in the Act.16 5
One provision stated that a panel member was prohibited from
being called as a witness during any subsequent trial. 166 In fashion-
ing this general rule of incompetency, the Act was in accord with
general evidence rules which, during the retrial of an action, bar
the testimony of a person who has served as a juror or who has sat
as the trial judge during the first trial.1 67
Although the Act provided that counsel could not make refer-
ences to insurance during the trial of the malpractice action,168 in
Carter v. Sparkman the court found that this provision was invalid
because it violated the supreme court's constitutional rule-making
power.169 In that opinion, however, the court accepted a new rule
of court which adopted the philosophy of the Act and prohibited
references to insurance during the malpractice trial.1 70
The Act provided that a defendant could elect not to mediate by
simply not filing an answer.17 1 In Carter, the supreme court con-
strued the Act to mean that when a defendant failed to participate
in a mediation proceeding, that fact was admissible into evidence
in a subsequent civil medical malpractice trial.17 2 Satisfactory ways
164. See Howarth & Scott, P.A. v. Edwards, 353 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1977); Floyd v. Goss, 352 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
165. FLA. STAT. § 768.47(2) (1979). A transcript of the evidence admitted during the me-
diation proceeding was usually hearsay evidence if it was offered during the civil trial. Only
if a witness was unavailable could a transcript be offered rather than calling the witness to
testify. See FLA. STAT. § 90.804(2)(a) (1979). See generally C. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE
(1977).
166. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(6) (1979).
167. See FLA. STAT. § 90.607 (1979). See generally C. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE §§
607.1-.2 (1977).
168. FLA. STAT. § 768.47(1) (1979).
169. 335 So. 2d at 806.
170. Id. at 806.
171. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(1)(c) (1979). Fla. R. Med. P. 20.190(a), 348 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla.
1977). The constitutionality of this was upheld in Carter, 335 So. 2d at 805.
172. 335 So. 2d at 805.
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to prove a defendant's failure to mediate included calling the de-
fendant as an adverse-party witness and asking him whether he
had elected to participate in the mediation proceeding or calling
the plaintiff to testify to the defendant's nonparticipation.
A more difficult question arose regarding the admissibility of evi-
dence relating to the findings of the mediation panel. Factual find-
ings could occur in two areas: (1) whether the defendant was ac-
tionably negligent; and (2) if the defendant was liable, the amount
of damages suffered by the claimant. While recognizing that the
purpose of the finding as to damages was to aid an out-of-court
settlement, the statute provided that this finding was not admissi-
ble in a subsequent civil action.'" 3 However, the finding by the
panel as to the actionable negligence of the defendant posed a
more difficult question. Florida Statutes provided that:
The conclusion of the hearing panel on the issue of liability may
be admitted into evidence in any subsequent trial .... Parties
may, in the opening statement or argument to the court or jury,
comment on the panel's conclusion in the same manner as any
other evidence introduced at trial. If there is a dissenting opinion,
the numerical vote of the panel shall also be admissible. Panel
members may not be called to testify as to the merits of the case.
The jury shall be instructed that the conclusion of the hearing
panel shall not be binding but shall be accorded such weight as
they choose to ascribe to it.174
This section provided for the admissibility of the written finding of
the mediation panel together with the vote of the panel, if the vote
was not unanimous.175 Although this evidence is otherwise hearsay,
a limited exception to the hearsay rule was created. However, if
the panel stated any reason for its finding, that part of the written
finding was inadmissible and was stricken if offered during a sub-
sequent trial.17 6
A claimant could effectively avoid the mediation process by not
presenting evidence to the mediation panel, if he accepted a find-
ing that "no actionable negligence" had been proven, and thereby
argued to the jury during a civil malpractice trial that the panel's
finding was meaningless since no evidence had been presented to
173. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(8) (1979).
174. FLA. STAT. § 768.47(2) (1979).
175. Id. But the ruling of a panel which lacked jurisdiction was not admissible as evi-
dence at trial. Cohen v. Johnson, 373 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
176. See Fisher v. Herrera, 367 So. 2d 204, 207 (Fla. 1979).
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it. The supreme court in Fisher v. Herrera 77 decided that a claim-
ant was not required to present evidence to the mediation panel
after he filed his claim. Apparently, the court negated the effec-
tiveness of this technique by limiting the admissibility of evidence
regarding the panel's finding during the civil trial to whether the
panel found the defendant to be "actionably negligent" or "not ac-
tionably negligent. ' 178 In its decision, the supreme court appar-
ently upheld the reasoning of the Third District Court of Appeal
and ruled that by standing silent before the mediation panel, a
claimant elected to assume the burden of overcoming an adverse
finding by the panel during the civil trial. 179 In limiting admissibil-
ity to the panel's finding of no actionable negligence, the district
court stated that: "A plaintiff against whom an adverse conclusion
has been entered by a mediation board can show no reasons for the
board's finding when he litigates the matter in court."'180 Therefore,
if the plaintiff elected not to present any evidence to the mediation
panel, he faced a major obstacle in the civil trial since he was not
allowed to inform the jury that the defendant was found not negli-
gent as a result of the plaintiff's failure to submit any evidence. A
jury would probably place great weight on the panel's finding.
Thus, a claimant/plaintiff who elected not to present evidence
before the mediation panel had to be prepared during a civil trial
to face an adverse finding by the mediation panel which he was not
allowed to explain or attack.' 8 '
However, the practical application of Herrera is uncertain. In or-
der for a jury to comprehend the importance of the mediation
panel's finding, it would seem that defense counsel would have had
to explain to them the foundation and role of the panel. The sterile
introduction of a finding of actionable negligence by a mediation
panel would not seem to be able to significantly influence a jury
because the jury would have no idea what it indicated. If Herrera
meant that neither counsel for the plaintiff nor counsel for the de-
fendant could comment upon the panel's finding, the significance
177. 367 So. 2d 204, 205-06 (Fla. 1979), afj'g Herrera v. Doctors Hosp., 360 So. 2d 1092
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
178. Id. at 207.
179. Id. at 206. See Herrera v. Doctors Hosp., 360 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1978).
180. 360 So. 2d at 1096. The supreme court did not comment upon this issue in its
opinion.
181. See Medel v. Valentine, 376 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 1979). The supreme court commented
that "the trial court committed error in permitting the jury to hear that [plaintiff]
presented no evidence before the mediation panel." Id. at 1156 n.2.
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of the finding in the jury's deliberations would be greatly dimin-
ished. On the other hand, if the decision did not bar defense coun-
sel from commenting upon the import of the panel's finding, it
would seem that the traditional rules pertaining to trial practice
and evidence would require that the plaintiff be able to rebut the
defendant's argument that "a panel of experts had already found
that the defendant was not actionably negligent." The plaintiff
could rebut with the argument 5 2 or the evidence"'3 that the panel
had decided in the defendant's favor because the plaintiff failed to
introduce any evidence before the panel in an attempt to avoid the
time and expense of two trials. This latter interpretation applies
the traditional "rule" that once a party opens the door to other-
wise inadmissible evidence, the adverse party is permitted to walk
through it.184 Allowing rebuttal argument and comment by defense
counsel would have been consistent with that part of the Act which
provided that: "Parties may, in the opening statement or argument
to the court or jury, comment on the panel's conclusion in the
same manner as any other evidence introduced at trial."1 85
182. During final arguments to the jury, otherwise improper arguments are justified
when they are in response to similar remarks by adverse counsel. See Leisure Group, Inc. v.
Williams, 351 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Jones v. State, 355 So. 2d 198 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
183. Many courts have held that when a party offers otherwise inadmissible evidence
which is admitted, the door has been opened, and "he should not [be] allowed to shut it in
the face of" the adverse party who offers similarly inadmissible evidence. Sprenger v.
Sprenger, 146 N.W.2d 36, 44 (N.D. 1966). See Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Griffin, 357 So. 2d 333,
343 (Ala. 1978) ("[ilrrelevant evidence may be admitted to rebut evidence of like charac-
ter"). See generally McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 57 (2d ed. 1972).
This interpretation of the Act forbidding comment upon the reasons for the panel reach-
ing its conclusion was inconsistent with the general rules of evidence. The panel's finding as
to actionable negligence was hearsay. When offered during a subsequent trial to prove the
defendant was negligent, the Act created an exception to the hearsay rule when it provided
for the decision's admissibility. The general rules of evidence permit attacks upon the credi-
bility of all evidence admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule. See C. EHRHARDT, FLOR-
IDA EVIDENCE § 806.1 (1977); J. WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE § 806.1 (1978); FED. R. Evw. 806.
Thus, a party would be able to demonstrate to the trier-of-fact any reason that the finding
of the mediation panel was not credible. The lack of any evidence from the claimant would
seem to detract from the weight the jury would give the panel's finding.
The Uniform Official Reports as Evidence Act, 9A U.L.A. 573 (1965), also provides an
exception to the hearsay rule for "[w]ritten reports or findings of fact made by officers" of a
state. Id. A decision of a medical mediation panel would have been such a report or finding
of fact. Section 3 of that Act provided for the cross-examination of the person making the
report. This cross-examination would permit inquiry into matters affecting the weight to be
given to the report. Id. at 578.
184. See Sprenger v. Sprenger, 146 N.W.2d 36 (N.D. 1966).
185. FLA. STAT. § 768.47(2) (1979).
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VI. THE DEATH
After the decision of the Florida Supreme Court upholding the
constitutionality of the Act, Florida trial courts continued to find
portions of the Act to be constitutionally infirm. 8 6 Finally, Dr.
Luis Aldana petitioned the supreme court for a writ of certiorari
from the order of a judicial referee who had refused to extend the
ten-month jurisdictional time limit after a mediation hearing re-
sulted in a mistrial because of statements made by the physician/
panelist indicating his prejudgment of the claim.18 7 Although there
was no assertion on appeal that the Act was unconstitutional, the
supreme court, upon its own motion, called for briefs from all par-
ties on the constitutional issues involved in the practical applica-
tion of the medical mediation procedure. 88 On February 28, 1980,
1,704 days after medical mediation became effective in Florida and
1,393 days after the supreme court had found that the Act passed
constitutional muster, medical mediation in Florida ceased to exist.
In Aldana, the supreme court found that the time limitations, es-
pecially the ten-month maximum, were jurisdictional and could
not be interpreted to permit extensions of time, because to do so
would unduly delay the filing of a civil malpractice action and un-
reasonably deny an aggrieved person access to the courts. 8 9 The
court found that the inflexibility of these time limits deprived the
litigants of due process because they operated in a manner which
was "intrinsically unfair and arbitrary and capricious in their ap-
plication." 90 Both the claimant and the defendant could be de-
prived of their right to mediation through no fault of their own.
The court carefully explained that in its previous decision in
Carter v. Sparkman, it had upheld the facial validity of the Act,
while in Aldana the practical operation and effect of the Act in a
mediation proceeding was inequitable and unworkable. 1' The
court did not declare unconstitutional all types of pretrial screen-
ing panels in medical malpractice hearings; the decision only held
186. See Tipton, Cases and Commentaries: Malpractice, 207 AcAD. FLA. TRIAL LAW J.
12; 205 ACAD. FLA. TRIAL LAW J. 3; 204 ACAD. FLA. TRIAL LAW J. 11; 196 ACAD. FLA. TRIAL
LAW J. 9 (1979).
187. See Aldana, 354 So. 2d at 1273.
188. Aldana, 381 So. 2d at 234. Aldana was consolidated with Abel v. Kirschgessner
where the judicial referee continued the mediation hearing on his own motion to a date
beyond the 10-month time period. Id. at 234.
189. Id. at 235.
190. Id. at 236.
191. Id. at 237.
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invalid the procedure set forth in the Act.' 2
VII. THE STUDY
This portion of the article contains some of the results of a sta-
tistical study of a sample of medical malpractice mediation claims
filed in Florida between July 1, 1975, and June 30, 1978.'19 Flor-
ida's fifteen most populous counties were chosen for this study.'"
During the summer of 1979, the medical mediation files in the
clerk of court's office in each of these counties were personally ex-
amined by a researcher, usually a law student, who completed a
questionnaire based on the information contained in the mediation
file and the file for the subsequent civil action, if there was one.
Claims filed subsequent to June 20, 1978, were not included be-
cause of the time lag involved in completing the mediation orocess.
If these later files had been used, the mediation process would not
have been completed in many of the claims and misleading statisti-
cal information possibly would have been obtained. The reported
information was current at the time the research was completed
(most counties were completed prior to September 15, 1979).
Although mediation files were not chosen on a random-sample
basis, the inclusion of all major counties should reflect filings in the
counties where the greatest number of mediaton claims have been
filed. The study attempted to consider every mediation claim filed
in the counties during the applicable time period; however, files
were occasionally missing in a clerk of court's office. In addition,
some mediation files contained insufficient information to com-
plete the questionnaires. And frequently, multiple defendants were
named in a mediation claim. For the purposes of the study, if one
pleading was filed asserting a claim for damages arising out of
medical malpractice, it was treated as a single claim even if multi-
ple defendants were involved. If individual proceedings were filed
against each of the defendants, then they were treated as separate
192. The court was careful to note that its holding was "that section 768.44, Florida
Statutes (1979), the medical mediation act, is unconstitutional." Id. at 238. The decision did
not address the question of whether other types of medical malpractice panels were also
invalid.
193. Portions of this study were previously published in a monograph, C. EHRHAWDr, A
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL LIABILITY MEDIATION PANELS IN FLORIDA (Center for Em-
ployment Rel. & Law 1980) (on file with Professor Ehrhardt, Florida State University Col-
lege of Law, Tallahassee, Fla.).
194. The counties involved in the study were Alachua, Brevard, Broward, Dade, Duval,
Escambia, Hillsborough, Lee, Leon, Orange, Palm Beach, Pinellas, Polk, Sarasota, and
Volusia.
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claims.
An attempt was made to determine whether plaintiffs were elect-
ing not to introduce evidence before the mediation panel, in light
of the decision in Fisher v. Herrera. However, the mediation files
frequently did not disclose what evidence, if any, was presented.
Thus, it was not possible to draw any meaningful conclusion from
the available data.
One of the items included on the questionnaire was whether the
mediation panel had been asked to render an advisory opinion as
to the amount of damage suffered by the claimant.1 5 In none of
the 789 hearings studied did the panel address itself to the ques-
tion of damages and, therefore, there are no tables included which
address this issue. Between July 1, 1975, and June 30, 1978, 2,162
separate malpractice mediation claims were filed in the fifteen
counties studied. Table A shows that the largest number of claims
filed in a single year was 843 in 1976. From this high mark, the
number of claims decreased by 12.1% in 1977 and by 22.9% in
1978 (assuming that the claims filed during the first six months of
1978 were 50% of the total claims filed during that year).
During the first six months of medical mediation in 1975, 51.4%
of the mediation claims filed were subsequently refiled as civil mal-
practice actions. The frequency dropped in the following years
with the percentage of claims in which civil actions were filed being
a constant 42% (within .8 percent). But only 3.1% of the 2,162
mediation claims progressed to a trial and verdict from a jury. This
figure will rise with the passage of time, since suits involving 325
defendants were pending during the period of data collection (see
Table B). 19'
Jury verdicts in which a defendant was found to have committed
malpractice were returned in only 1.9% of the mediation claims
that were studied. However, this low percentage does not indicate
that only 1.9% of the defendants sued were negligent since many
cases would not progress to trial for other unrelated reasons; for
instance, the parties would often reach a pretrial settlement in the
case or the parties would not proceed with the suit because of the
expense involved.
In the 67 civil actions that resulted in a jury verdict, 77 defen-
dants were alleged to have committed malpractice. The jury re-
195. See text at note 155 supra.
196. Even if the number of defendants still having suits pending is subtracted from the
total number of claims (2,162 less 325), only 3.7% of the mediation claims studied could
ultimately result in a jury verdict.
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turned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff against 41 (53.2%) of the
defendants; while jury verdicts were entered in favor of 36 (46.8%)
of the defendants.
TABLE A
Mediation Claims and Subsequent
Civil Malpractice Actions
Date Mediation Claim Filed
Through
June 30,
1975 1976 1977 1978 Total
Number of mediation claims filed
Number of claims in which civil
suit was subsequently filed
Percentage of claims in which
civil suits filed
Number of claims that subsequently
resulted in a jury verdict
Percentage of claims that
subsequently resulted in a
jury verdict





253 843 741 325 2,162
130 359 307 139
51.4 42.6 41.4 42.8 43.2
19 35 10 3 67
7.5 4.2 1.3 1.0 3.1
12 17 5 2 36
11 17 12 1 41
A majority of the 935 civil malpractice actions that were filed
following the completion of the medical mediation proceeding did
not progress to a trial and finding of fact by the jury. The com-
plaint in many of the civil actions alleged that more than one de-
fendant had committed malpractice. Table B tabulates the reasons
indicated in the civil case file that a jury trial had not been held
for each defendant named. Civil actions were pending against
26.9% of the 1,208 defendants at the time this research was com-
pleted. Some of these actions will subsequently be tried before a
jury. The case files reflected that 231 (19.1%) of the defendants
had a voluntary dismissal entered.
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TABLE B
Reasons No Trial Held After Civil
Malpractice Suit Filed
(by individual defendant sued)
Date Mediation Claim Filed
Through
June 30,
1975 1976 1977 1978 Total
Reasons:
Trial pending 23 62 140 100 325
Settlement 31 112 73 15 231
Voluntary dismissal 11 46 53 9 119
Dismissal-summary judgment 8 13 4 2 30
Dismissal-failure to prosecute 11 23 13 3 47
Case transferred 0 7 5 1 13
File missing 2 36 52 24 114
Other 54 118 50 30 252
The specialty or type of each defendant named in each malprac-
tice claim is recorded in Table C. Hospitals were the most fre-
quently named defendants; they were named 766 times. Obstetrics
and gynecology was the medical specialty named the most fre-
quently-348 times. General surgery was the specialty of 298 de-
fendants, while orthopedic surgery was named 247 times. The
number in the category of "other" specialties in Table C is unfor-
tunately large. Researchers orally reported that emergency
medicine specialists and surgeons possessing different subspecial-
ties were the most frequent defendants within this category.
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TABLE C
Type of Defendant Named in
Medical Mediation Claims
Date Mediation Claim Filed
Through
Defendant June 30,
Named 1975 1976 1977 1978 Total
Hospital 79 292 259 136 766
Obstetrics/gynecology 49 126 112 61 348
General surgeon 30 124 110 34 298
Orthopedic surgeon 29 108 74 36 247
Internal medicine 17 86 55 21 189
General practitioner 23 79 55 23 180
Pediatrics 10 13 24 6 53
Anesthesiologist 8 19 15 10 52
Eye, ear, nose and throat 2 16 9 2 29
Other 140 379 331 142 992
Unknown 25 77 79 36 217
More than one defendant may be named in a mediation claim.
Table D discloses that in the claims filed during the study period,
3,360 defendants were alleged to have been negligent. Table D in-
dicates that 18.3% of the defendants named in mediation claims
filed during 1975 elected to avoid the mediation process by not
filing an answer. The percentage of nonanswering defendants
dropped from 18.3% in 1975 to 12.3% in 1976. This rate remained
relatively stable in 1977 and 1978. In 1977, 11.7% of the defen-
dants failed to answer, and in 1978, 10% of them elected not to do
SO.
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TABLE D
Defendants Who Did Not File
Answer to Mediation Claim
Date Mediation Claim Filed
Through
June 30,
1975 1976 1977 1978 Total
Total number of defendants
named in mediation claims 409 1,329 1,121 501 3,360
Number of the defendants who
filed answer 334 1,165 1,004 451 2,954
Number of defendants who did
not file answer 75 164 117 50 406
Percent of defendants who did
not file answer 18.3 12.3 11.7 10.0 12.1
Sixty-three percent of the 3,360 defendants named in the mal-
practice claims studied were not involved in a hearing before a me-
diation panel to determine whether they were actionably negligent.
Table E indicates the reason that a mediation hearing for each de-
fendant was not held. Voluntary dismissals of the mediation claims
were filed against 16.8% of the defendants, while 12.1% of the de-
fendants elected to avoid a hearing by not filing an answer to the
mediation claim. A dismissal was "stipulated" against 10.3 % of the
defendants.
In its opinion finding the Act to be unconstitutional, the Florida
Supreme Court placed great weight on the "over seventy" cases
that were dismissed because a jurisdictional time period had ex-
pired. 197 Despite the court's research involving appellate decisions,
it is interesting to note that such cases occurred relatively infre-
quently. Of the 3,360 defendants who had mediation claims filed
against them, only 6.5% of the defendants had the claim dismissed
because the 120-day period had expired and 4.4% of the defen-
dants had the claim dismissed because the ten-month time period
expired. Since the running of' the jurisdictional periods often de-
prived the parties of their right to mediate when the equities indi-
cated that the loss of mediation should not have occurred, it is
probable that a party's feeling that he had been treated unfairly
resulted in a high proportion of these cases being appealed.
197. Aldana, 381 So. 2d at 236.
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TABLE E
Reasons Mediation Hearing Was Not Held
For Individual Defendants
Date Mediation Claim Filed
Through
June 30,
1975 1976 1977 1978 Total
Voluntary dismissal 54 262 180 67 563
No answer filed 75 164 117 50 406
Dismissal stipulated 36 141 112 56 345
Dismissal-expiration of 120
days from filing 30 60 87 40 217
Dismissal-expiration of 10
months from filing 49 65 24 10 148
Dismissal-specialty outside
statute 3 9 6 3 21
Transferred to another county 5 3 5 5 18
Dismissal-statute of limitation 10 2 0 0 12
Settlement 2 12 8 5 27
Other 68 163 79 50 360
257 717 501 236 1,711
A mediation hearing was held in only 36.4% of the total media-
tion claims studied. The data in Table F discloses little correlation
between population or geographic location of the county and the
frequency with which a hearing was actually held. Hearings oc-
curred in only 17.1% of the claims filed in Alachua County and
21.2% of the claims filed in Duval County. On the other hand, a
hearing resulted in 61.1% of the claims filed in Lee County and in
57.6% of the claims filed in Polk County.
Actionable negligence was found by the mediation panel in only
7.1% of the total claims studied. A finding that there was no negli-
gence by the defendant was entered in 29.4% of the claims. There
was no finding regarding actionable negligence in the remaining
63.5% of the claims because no mediation hearing ever occurred
for those claims. Duval County had the lowest frequency of action-
able negligence findings: only 1.2% of the total claims filed re-
sulted in such a finding (Duval was also second lowest in the per-
centage of claims resulting in a hearing). The highest frequency of
actionable negligence occurred in Leon County where 19.4% of the
claims resulted in that finding (Leon County was second highest in
percentage of claims which resulted in a hearing). On the other
hand, Table F discloses several counties in which this correlation
between the number of hearings held and findings of actionable
negligence is absent. For instance, Dade County had a low (6.3%)
19801 .203
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frequency of actionably negligent findings by the panel but a rela-
tively high percentage (41.5%) of its claims progressed to a media-
tion hearing. The statistics in Table F are probably more meaning-
ful in reflecting the differences between counties in the frequency
of actionable negligence findings when a mediation hearing is held.
TABLE F






































































































*If mediation claim involved multiple defendants and a finding of actionable
negligence was made as to at least one of the defendants, the claim is recorded
in this column.
The mediation panel determined in a written finding whether
each defendant was or was not "actionably negligent."19' If only
one defendant was named in the claim, it was obvious at the con-
clusion of a mediation hearing whether the panel's findings favored
the claimant. If there were multiple defendants and the panel's
findings were identical, it was also obvious whether the panel's
finding was in favor of the claimant. However, when multiple de-
fendants were not all found either "actionably negligent" or "not
actionably negligent" by the mediation panel, it was difficult to
198. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(7), .47(2) (1979).
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categorize the decisions as being entirely in favor of either the
claimant or the defendant. The number and percentage of media-
tion hearings in which at least one defendant was found to be ac-
tionably negligent and the hearings in which no defendants were
found to be actionably negligent are reflected in Table G. At least
one defendant was found actionably negligent in 19.4% of the 789
hearings. In 80.6% of the hearings, no defendants were found to
have been negligent. The range between the counties in the fre-
quency of findings of negligence was wide. Only 5.5% of the hear-
ings resulted in negligence findings in Duval County, and 15.2% of
the hearings had a similar result in Dade County. However, 28.7%
of the hearings in Broward County and 33.3% of the hearings in
Alachua County resulted in a negligence finding for at least one
defendant. The highest frequency of negligence findings was 46.2%
in Leon County. (The small number of hearings held in both Leon
and Alachua counties may make these figures misleading.)
TABLE G
Results of Mediation Hearings
Number and percentage of Number and percentage
hearings in which at of hearings in which
least one defendant no defendants were
County found negligent found negligent
Alachua. 2 33.3 4 66.7
Brevard 2 15.4 11 84.6
Broward 37 28.7 92 71.3
Dade 43 15.2 240 84.2
Duval 2 5.5 34 94.5
Escambia 5 20.8 19 79.2
Hillsborough 13 26.5 36 73.5
Lee 3 27.3 8 72.7
Leon 6 46.2 7 53.8
Orange 10 18.9 43 81.1
Palm Beach 11 22.4 38 77.6
Pinellas 5 12.2 36 87.8
Polk 6 15.8 32 84.2
Sarasota 2 9.1 20 90.9
Volusia 6 27.2 16 72.8
153 19.4 636 80.6
Regardless of whether a defendant was found to be "actionably
negligent" or "not actionably negligent," the findings of the media-
tion panel were almost always unanimous. The finding of actiona-
ble negligence on the part of an individual defendant was by a
"split" 2-1 vote of the panel only 71 times in the 789 claims in
which a mediation hearing was held (see Table H). The panel's
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decision was unanimous in 93.2% of the hearings. Since the three
panelists were almost always in agreement as to whether a particu-
lar defendant was actionably negligent, there is a possibility of ei-
ther a conscious or unconscious agreement among the panelists to
act unanimously.
TABLE H
Vote of Mediation Panel
Unanimous vote of 2-1 vote
panel of panel
Total number of claims in
which hearing held 718 71
Number of hearings in which
all defendants were found
negligent 82 22
Number of hearings in which
no defendant was found
negligent 601 35
Number of hearings in which
some defendant(s) were found
negligent 35 14
The physician/panelist was less likely to vote that his fellow
physician/defendant was actionably negligent than were either the
judicial referee or the attorney/panelist. The frequency with which
each type of panelist voted either "actionably negligent" or "not
actionably negligent" in the 789 hearings is tabulated in Table I.
TABLE I





Cast 1975 1976 1977 1978 Total
Judicial referee 1,243 11.1 19.3 18.8 15.0 17.7
Attorney 1,243 10.1 19.3 18.8 14.5 17.5
Physician 1,243 10.1 14.1 13.7 14.5 13.7
The lawyer and the judicial referee each found actionable negli-
gence by approximately the same number of defendants. The judi-
cial referee found that 17.7% of the defendants for whom a media-
tion hearing was held had been actionably negligent. The attorney/
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panelist found that 17.5% of the defendants were negligent. Ac-
cording to the data in Table I, the physician/panelist was less
likely to find a defendant actionably negligent than was either
other panelist. Only 13.7% of the votes cast by the physician/pan-
elists were for actionable negligence. 1 9
The finding that the physician was the least likely of the three
panelists to vote a defendant actionably negligent is confirmed by
the data reflected in Table J. The few hearings in which a panelist
dissented were analyzed and the vote of the dissenting panelist was
recorded. Not only did the physician/panelist dissent most fre-
quently, in almost all of his dissents he found the defendant to be
free of negligence despite agreement by the other two panelists
that negligence had occurred. When either the judicial referee or
the attorney dissented, he usually believed a defendant to be negli-
gent, despite a contrary finding by the other panel members.
TABLE J
Frequency of Dissenting Votes
Dissented and Found Dissented and Found
Negligence No Negligence




During Florida's brief experiment with medical malpractice me-
diation panels, it became clear that the Florida Legislature, in its
rush to respond to the medical malpractice insurance "crisis," had
enacted a statutory scheme that deprived the persons involved in
an alleged act of malpractice of a fair and easily understood pre-
trial screening procedure. Although lawyers representing patients
complained the loudest about medical mediation, the Act did not
discriminate against either the patient or the physician; its appli-
cation to both groups was equally arbitrary and capricious. In fact,
it was during an appeal by a physician from his denial of a media-
tion hearing that the supreme court found the Act to be unconsti-
tutional as it was applied.
199. It should be noted that the frequency of "actionably negligent" votes cast by the
physician/panelist was similar to that of the judicial referee and attorney/panelist in the
hearings held on claims filed during the first six months of 1978.
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While medical mediation existed, the majority of mediation
claims that were filed did not proceed to a mediation hearing;
when a hearing was held, the mediation panel's finding usually fa-
vored the defendant. The data compiled during the study did not
establish whether the legislative intent to encourage settlement of
both meritorious and nonmeritorious malpractice claims was ful-
filled by the Florida mediation process. Before any pretrial screen-
ing procedure is enacted (or reenacted in Florida), the legislative
body considering the issue should determine whether the expensive
and time-consuming pretrial screening process will encourage set-
tlement of both meritorious and nonmeritorious claims. If it is de-
termined that the pretrial mediation process will have the desired
effect, any legislative action in Florida, or elsewhere, will hopefully
profit from Florida's 1,700-day lesson-to be successful, a pretrial
medical malpractice screening procedure cannot operate as a trap
for the unwary.
